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Executive Summary
In this edition of Trade Watch, we address three questions concerning recent trade developments: What is happening? Why? Does it matter?
What Is Happening?
2016 is the fifth consecutive year of sluggish trade growth and the year with the weakest trade performance since the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (figure ES1a). Current estimates of growth in the volumes of trade in goods and services range from 1.9 percent to 2.5 percent, but preliminary high-frequency data suggest that merchandise trade volumes may have grown by only about 1 percent. The year 2016 is different from the other post crisis years, in that trade sluggishness is a characteristic of both advanced and emerging economies. 2
Why?
Trade developments in 2016 continued to reflect enduring structural determinants, such as the maturing of global value chains (GVCs) and the slower pace of trade liberalization, and cyclical factors, notably slow global growth, the trough in commodity prices, and macroeconomic rebalancing in China (figure ES2). Foreign value added (% of exports), WIOD 2013 WIOD (1995 WIOD -2011 Foreign value added (% of exports), WIOD 2016 WIOD (2000 WIOD -2014 ) Import content, % of manufacturing exports (WITS, WIOD) Source: The 2013 and 2016 releases of World Input-Output Database (WIOD 2013 and WIOD 2016) (Timmer et al. 2015) , UN Comtrade (World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)), and authors' calculations. Notes: The measures of vertical specialization based on WIOD 2013 and 2016 data are shares of foreign value added in gross exports of goods and services. The third measure relies on manufacturing trade data from the UN Comtrade (obtained via WITS) and output data from WIOD.
The increase in policy uncertainty may also have contributed to trade slowing down further in 2016 (figure ES3). The negative association between economic policy uncertainty and trade growth that emerges from the prima facie evidence is confirmed when we look at a broader sample spanning 18 countries over 30 years ( figure ES4 ). The regression analysis in Chapter 1 indicates that a 1 percent increase in uncertainty is associated with a 0.02-percentage point reduction in goods and services trade volume growth. This implies that the increase in uncertainty in 2016 may have reduced trade growth by about 0.6 percentage points, which is equivalent to 75 percent of the difference between trade growth rates in 2015 and 2016. 
Does It Matter?
The trade slowdown, insofar as it is attributable to the stagnation of GVCs, may also help to explain part of the recent productivity slowdown. The slower pace of GVC expansion could be diminishing the scope of productivity growth through a more efficient international division of labor and diffusion of technologies.
Analysis of manufacturing data according to country and year reveals a link between labor productivity and GVCs. The data point to a positive association between growth in real labor productivity per employee in manufacturing and growth in vertical specialization ( figure ES5) . A formal econometric analysis based on a panel estimation covering 13 sectors in 40 countries over 15 years suggests that participation in GVCs is a significant driver of labor productivity. An increase of 10 percent in the level of GVC participation increased average productivity by 1.7 percent. (Timmer et al. 2015) . Notes: Each dot represents a country-year combination. Petrochemicals are excluded from the manufacturing aggregate. Labor productivity is computed as the real value added divided by the number of persons employed. Vertical specialization in manufacturing for each country and year includes the foreign value added embodied in exports (backward linkages) as well as the domestic value added embodied in exports that the direct importer exports further or that returns home as imports (forward linkages). Trade sluggishness in 2016 is a characteristic of advanced and emerging economies. In 2012 and 2013, the dynamism of emerging economies largely sustained world trade growth as advanced economies struggled to recover from the financial crisis. This situation was reversed in 2014 and 2015, with declining commodity prices and macroeconomic rebalancing in China affecting emerging economies 7 more strongly (Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta 2016a) . Different from the other post crisis years, in 2016, trade sluggishness is a characteristic of advanced and emerging economies (figure 3). Within each group, however, there is evidence of heterogeneity, with some countries or regions doing better than others, as illustrated by the breakdown of contributions to the growth in global merchandise trade volumes by region provided in the Annex (figure A3). 
Recent trade developments should be seen in the context of a deceleration in trade growth since the early 2000s and particularly since the global financial crisis.
In previous work (Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta 2015) , we estimated the relationship between world trade and gross domestic product (GDP) in the last four decades and found that the long-term trade elasticity rose significantly in the 1990s and then declined in the 2000s. Trade appears to have grown more slowly not only because global growth is lower, but also because that growth has become less trade intensive.
Structural factors continue to contribute to the trade slowdown, including a slower pace of trade liberalization and maturation of GVCs. First, the slower pace of trade liberalization may have contributed to the decline in growth of world trade relative to world output in recent years. Box 1 shows the contribution of trade agreements to trade growth. Second, changes in international vertical specialization underlie the slowdown in world trade. Trade growth raced ahead of output growth as production fragmented internationally into GVCs, leading to a rapid surge in trade in parts and components. As this process matured, trade growth decreased.
5 Chapter 2 provides new evidence of the evolution of GVCs and its effect on productivity growth.
The two mutually reinforcing factors driving weak trade growth in 2015, lower commodity prices and China's transition to a new growth path, although still at work, were attenuated in 2016.
• Prices of commodities, particularly fuels, which experienced large declines starting in mid-2014, bottomed out in early 2016, arresting the deterioration in the terms of trade of commodity exporting countries. However, prices remained low throughout the year, preventing a significant increase in the export and hence import values of these countries (figure 4). • China's transition to a new growth path that is less dependent on exports, investment, and industrial production continued. Export and import levels remained below the pre-2015 trend. Exports in 2016 were also slightly below the level in 2015, a reflection of weak global demand (figure 5).
A surge in economic policy uncertainty in 2016 may have contributed to trade sluggishness. Economic policy uncertainty may influence trade through two main channels. First, a rise in economic policy uncertainty reduces trade by reducing GDP growth. In a less-certain environment, firms may choose to postpone investment decisions, consumers may cut back spending, and banks may increase the cost of finance. 6 Second, to the extent that the surge in economic policy uncertainty is due to trade policy uncertainty in particular, this may affect trade directly. Handley and Limao (2015) find that trade policy uncertainty delays firms' entry into foreign markets.
The pattern of world trade is closely associated with economic policy uncertainty.
7 Figure 6 shows that trade growth from 2012 to 2016 tracks economic policy uncertainty with a lag of a few months. 8 The negative association between economic policy uncertainty and trade growth is visible when examining a broader sample spanning 18 countries and up to 30 years (figure 7). Regression analysis confirms a statistically significant relationship between economic policy uncertainty and trade growth: a 1 percent increase 9 This box has been prepared in collaboration with Alen Mulabdic. 10 The data on the content of trade agreements can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/deeptrade-agreements. 
Chapter 2: Trade and Productivity Slowdowns: The role of global Value Chains
We are witnessing a decline in the growth of trade and productivity. World trade grew at approximately 3 percent per year from 2012 to 2016, which is much lower than the pre-crisis average of 7 percent for 1994 to 2008. Productivity growth also has declined, to 1 percent per year after the crisis from an average of 2 percent from 1994 to 2008 (figure 9). Consider now the development of global value chains (GVCs) over broadly the same period. 11 One measure of the importance of GVCs is the share of foreign value added embodied in gross exports. Data on this measure from the recent update of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD 2016) point to stalled or even negative growth in vertical specialization since 2011 (figure 10). World GVC participation had been increasing throughout the 2000s but at a slower rate than in the 1990s. The share of import content in manufacturing exports, an alternative measure of vertical specialization computed using a simplified methodology applied to trade data from UN Comtrade (via WITS) and sectoral output data from WIOD, suggests a similar dynamic.
Previous research has demonstrated that the slowing expansion in GVCs can partially explain the current trade slowdown (World Bank Group 2015; Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta 2015) . Specifically, research has shown, first, that world trade is growing slowly not only because GDP growth is sluggish, but also because the long-run relationship between trade and GDP is changing. The elasticity of world trade to GDP was greater than 2 in the 1990s but closer to 1 and declining throughout the 2000s. Second, the varying pace of the expansion of GVCs is a key contributing factor of the changing long-run relationship between world trade and GDP. Changes in GVC participation from 1990 to 2014 at the world level account for approximately half of the decline in trade elasticity to income.
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This chapter investigates whether changes in vertical specialization, as manifested in GVCs, can help explain the current productivity slowdown. Trade in general can lead to productivity gains through multiple channels that are the object of a large body of research.
13 As far as participation in GVCs is concerned, recent theoretical models have shown that productivity gains associated with offshoring and GVCs may accrue from the finer international division of labor, which is isomorphic to factoraugmenting technical change (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) , as well as from increased competition, greater diversity in input varieties, learning externalities, and technology spillovers (Li and Liu 2014; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014) . Despite this wealth of arguments, empirical research in support of the theoretical predictions linking GVCs to productivity is limited. 14 We begin by inspecting whether manufacturing data by country and year reveal a link between labor productivity and GVCs. Labor productivity is computed as real value added divided by number of persons employed. Vertical specialization in manufacturing industries is defined as the sum of the foreign value added embodied in exports (backward linkages) and the domestic value added in exports that the direct importer exports further or that returns home as imports (forward linkages). The data (figure 11) indicate a positive association between growth in real labor productivity per employee in manufacturing according to country and year and growth in vertical specialization. (Timmer et al. 2015) . Notes: Each dot represents a country-year combination. Petrochemicals are excluded from the manufacturing aggregate. Labor productivity is computed as the real value added divided by the number of persons employed. Vertical specialization in manufacturing for each country and year includes the foreign value added embodied in exports (backward linkages) as well as the domestic value added embodied in exports that the direct importer exports further or that returns home as imports (forward linkages).
Although suggestive, the correlation in figure 11 does not demonstrate a causal relationship. Therefore, drawing on Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta (2016b, 2017) , we report the findings of a more formal econometric analysis of this relationship. Results based on a panel estimation covering 13 sectors in 40 countries over 15 years suggest that participation in GVCs is a significant driver of labor productivity. An increase of 10 percent in the level of GVC participation increased average productivity by 1.7 percent.
To obtain these results, we empirically investigate the link between GVC participation and productivity, by regressing labor productivity on variables capturing the intensity of GVC integration while controlling for a number of other determinants of productivity. 15 Two conventionally used indicators are considered as measures of vertical specialization (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001; Koopman, Wang and Wei 2014) . The first captures the extent of backward participation in GVCs and consists of the foreign value added embodied in gross exports. The second indicator captures the forward participation in GVCs and includes the domestic value added embodied in gross exports that direct importers export further or that returns home as imports.
The first step of the analysis determines that labor productivity is significantly associated with overall imports and overall exports of goods and services. This result is consistent with the literature, which identifies multiple routes through which trade affects productivity: enhanced competition through imports at the same stage of production, greater access to better-quality or more-diverse imported inputs (e.g., Amiti and Konings 2007; Goldberg et al. 2010) , and learning by exporting (De Loecker 2013). Next, we split imports and exports according to types of goods and services. The results reported in figure 12 highlight the relative importance of the imported input channel. A 10 percent increase in the level of imports of intermediates increases labor productivity by 2 percent. 16 Coefficients of other types of trade are not significant or weakly significant. 17 15 The two main sources of the data are the 2013 Release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD 2013) and WIOD Socioeconomic accounts (Timmer et al. 2015) . WIOD 2013 covers 40 countries, 35 sectors (ISIC rev. 3), and 17 years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . Estimations are based on a subsample of 13 manufacturing industries, and span 1995 to 2009 because missing real capital stock caused 2010 and 2011 to be dropped from the sample. All trade-related measures were deflated to eliminate price effects. The analysis focuses on the productivity of manufacturing industries because these are more GVC intensive. The fact that the participation of services industries in GVCs is more difficult to quantify fully further motivated their exclusion. 16 The magnitude of the effect is the result of averaging across countries and sectors that vary widely in their propensity to import intermediates. These compositional aspects may explain why country-specific and firmlevel studies typically find larger effects (Amiti and Konings 2007; Blaum, Lelarge and Peters 2014) . 17 The lack of significance of final goods imports and exports of intermediates may result from multicollinearity because imports of intermediates embodied in exports are included in the import and export covariates. (Timmer et al. 2015) . Notes: Based on panel regressions of log of real value added per employee, by industry, country, and year, on log of real capital stock per employee, log of price-deflated trade indicators (lagged 1 year), and fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at country-industry level are used. The coefficient reported for foreign value added embodied in exports is an instrumental variable (IV) estimate.
Finally, we dig deeper into the relationship between intermediate imports and labor productivity by separating GVC-related imported inputs from non-GVC-related imported inputs. As discussed, the proxy for GVC-related imports of inputs is the foreign value added embodied in exports, the conventional measure of backward vertical specialization. For imports that are not related to GVCs, we use the foreign value added absorbed domestically. Results suggest that imported inputs that are GVC-related matter for productivity. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the level of GVC-related imports of intermediates increases labor productivity by 1.7 percent.
This chapter provides evidence that GVCs increases productivity. Although many factors determine the rate of productivity growth, this evidence suggests that the slower pace of GVC expansion is contributing to slower world productivity growth. In turn, the slowing down of GVC expansion may in part be the result of policy choices, as the benefits of past trade reforms have matured and new reforms have languished. Indeed, recent research shows that the deepening of trade agreements has underpinned the rise of GVCs in the last quarter century by reducing trade costs and providing the institutional infrastructure for the smooth functioning of cross-border value chains (Osnago et al. 2016) . Preserving and expanding the reach of trade agreements, rather than backtracking on existing commitments, would help to sustain the growth of productivity. . Growth indicators are computed as log-differences. A lag effect is allowed in specifications (1b) and (2b).
